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Geographical imbalances in the health workforce have been a consistent feature of nearly 
all health systems, and especially in developing countries.  In this paper we investigate 
the willingness to work in a rural area among final year nursing and medical students in 
Ethiopia.  Analyzing data obtained from contingent valuation questions, we find that 
household consumption and the student’s motivation to help the poor, which is our proxy 
for intrinsic motivation, are the main determinants of willingness to work in a rural area.  
We investigate who are willing to help the poor and find that women are significantly 
more likely to help than men.  Other variables, including a rich set of psycho-social 
characteristics, are not significant.  Finally, we carry out some simulations on how much 
it would cost to make the entire cohort of starting nurses and doctors choose to take up a 
rural post.   
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There is an obvious difference between rural and urban postings. Working 
in rural areas involves helping the poor... in urban areas, one can learn, 
have more income, have good schools for one’s children. 
--Health worker in Ethiopia 
 
1.  Introduction 
Health services depend critically on the size, skills, and commitment of the health 
workforce. Human resources have been a long-standing policy concern in both developed 
and developing countries. A number of recent reports have pointed out that human 
resources comprise a fundamental constraint to improving health outcomes and reaching 
the Millennium Development Goals (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; USAID, 2003; 
2002; World Bank, 2004). While human resource challenges take many dimensions—
shortages, geographic imbalances, international migration, low skills and inappropriate 
skills mix, poor performance and low motivation, etc.—this paper focuses on the specific 
issue of geographical imbalances. Geographic imbalances in the health workforce have 
been a persistent feature of nearly all health systems. Given the obvious relationship 
between the number of health workers and the capacity to deliver services—both in terms 
of volume and quality, the distribution of health professionals has implications for equity 
in access to health services. But the distribution of health professionals is also an 
efficiency issue: the under-provision of cost-effective interventions in some areas implies 
that overall health outcomes could be improved through a reallocation of resources.  
Our analysis is based on a survey of final year nursing and medical students in 
Ethiopia. The survey included detailed questions on student background and 
characteristics, the use of contingent valuation methods to elicit monetary valuations of 
different types jobs in the health sector, and survey-based and experimental approaches to 
measuring intrinsic motivation. Together, these data shed new light on the factors that 
influence the willingness to work in rural areas among a new cohort of health workers. 
Ultimately, the difficulties in attracting and retaining staff in rural facilities are 
rooted in the preferences and choices of health professionals. Evidence from various 
countries suggests that, while financial rewards are important, they are not the only 
consideration. In choosing where to work, other considerations come into play, including 
training opportunities, career development prospects, living conditions, workload, 
colleagues and working conditions, and social, family and security concerns, etc. (Hays, 
Veitch, Cheers, & Crossland, 1997; Kamien, 1998; Peters, Yazbeck, Sharma, Ramana, 
Pritchett, & Wagstaff, 2002; Shields, 2004). Hence, the general preference for work in 
urban and affluent areas is not surprising. Work in rural areas is often associated with 
reduced access to training, limited professional interaction with peers, reduced exposure 
to technical sophistication, heavy responsibilities and workload, social isolation, poor    
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social services, and, in some cases, limited opportunities for income-generation through a 
second job or other economic activity. 
Countries have enlisted a wide range of strategies to redress geographical 
imbalances in the health workforce. The most direct approach—often referred to as 
compulsory service or bonding—is to mandate service on specific facilities or locations. 
This also ensures that public resources invested in the training of health professionals are 
recouped.
2 But this dirigiste approach has proven difficult to manage and enforce in 
practice. Many schemes have suffered from corruption and favoritism, and the possibility 
for well connected or better-off individuals to bypass the scheme has undermined their 
legitimacy (Wibulpolprasert & Pengpaibon, 2003). But even if these management 
problems can be overcome, compulsory service may render the health professions less 
attractive, with potential long-term implications for the workforce. In Indonesia,   
Sepowski (2004) found that health professionals who choose to work in a rural or 
underserved area, rather than doing so as part of a contractual obligation, are more likely 
to stay long-term.  
A less direct, but arguably more efficient approach is to rely on economic—
financial or non-financial—incentives. These incentives may take many forms, ranging 
from rural allowances or bonuses, subsidized housing, access to promotion or specialist 
training, choice of jobs, etc. Although the use of economic incentives is commonplace, 
experience shows that providing financial incentives on their own often has limited 
impact, and can be very expensive (Anderson & Rosenberg, 1990; Nigenda, 1997; 
Sempowski, 2004).  
In recognition of these limitations, some countries have pursued strategies which 
recognize that health workers (or potential recruits to the health profession) are not 
homogeneous, and that preferences concerning rural and urban postings are malleable. 
They argue that due to differences in background, education, personality, and other 
factors, health workers differ in their views on the relative desirability of urban and rural 
postings. For example, the US (Rabinowitz, Diamond, Markham, & Hazelwood, 1999), 
Australia (Easterbrook, Godwin, Wilson, Hodgetts, Brown, Pong et al., 1999; Rolfe, 
Pearson, O'Connell, & Dickinson, 1995), Thailand (Wibulpolprasert & Pengpaibon, 
2003), and Indonesia (Chomitz, Setiadi, Azwar, Ismail, & Widiyarti, 1998) make special 
efforts to recruit students with a strong commitment to rural service, and aim to expose 
students to work in rural areas through job rotation.  Experience shows that students 
recruited from rural areas are more likely to return to rural areas, and that they are more 
responsive to incentives that encourage working in a rural area (Chomitz, Setiadi, Azwar 
et al., 1998; Kristiansen & Forde, 1992; Laven & Wilkinson, 2003).   
                                                 
2 For example, Thailand used compulsory service linked to scholarships for many years, with severe fines 
for breach of contract (Wibulpolprasert, 1999). A similar approach has been used in Indonesia, South 
Africa, and some former socialist countries. As discussed further below, Ethiopia also has a a bonding 




Although of considerable interest, international experiences with strategies to 
redress geographical workforce imbalances provides limited operational guidance. What 
level of financial incentives is needed to convince health workers to accept rural 
postings? What is the relative importance of different individual characteristics on the 
willingness to accept a rural job? The existing literature has little to offer with respect to 
these questions. In trying to fill this gap, we have to address two methodological 
questions.  
First, how can we elicit information about monetary valuations? In seeking to 
understand the labor market choice of health workers and their willingness to work in a 
rural area, it is natural to look at actual choices. This has been the approach of a number 
of studies (Bolduc, Fortin, & Fournier, 1996; Hurley, 1990; Kristiansen & Forde, 1992). 
Yet, the approach has important limitations. In many cases the government plays an 
important role in the allocation of health workers, and actual salaries do not reflect 
personal valuations. In addition, there is usually limited variation in the actual 
compensation of health workers, especially when the public sector dominates health 
service provision. Finally, even when there is a market, or the possibility of creating one, 
market prices or wages will not reflect non-pecuniary benefits, like access to training etc. 
Situations such as these have led researchers to rely on contingent valuation and other 
stated preference methods. The use of contingent valuation has a long tradition in 
economics, going back to Ciriacy-Wantrup  and Schelling . Its aim is to place a monetary 
value on a good for which there is no market and, therefore, demand is unobservable. 
Although contingent valuation methods have been used extensively in areas such as 
environmental policy (Lockwood, 1998)
3, its use in the field of human resources in health 
is rare.
4 One important exception is the study by Chomitz et al. (Chomitz, Setiadi, Azwar 
et al., 1998), which uses a stated-preference approach to elicit information about the 
preferences of medical students in Indonesia. They find that moderately remote areas can 
be staffed using modest cash incentives, but that financial incentives would be 
prohibitively expensive for staffing very remote facilities. They also find that doctors 
who were recruited to medical school from the Outer Islands of Indonesia are more 
willing to serve in remote areas than their counterparts from Java, and that they required a 
lower financial incentive to accept a remote posting. 
 
                                                 
3 Typical examples can be found in environmental economics: without a monetary value of pollution it is 
impossible to implement, for instance, Pigouvian taxes or find the optimal level of pollution; the cost-
benefit analysis of a new park requires  some monetary value for it; payment of restitutions by Exxon 
following the Exxon Valdes oil spill implies the knowledge of the valuation of the negative environmental 
effect of the spill. 
4 Some studies have used contingent valuation methods to assess willingness to pay for health services 
(Donaldson, Shackley, & Abdalla, 1997; Luchini, Protiere, & Moatti, 2003; Mataria, Donaldson, Luchini, 
& Moatti, 2004).    
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Second, while past studies have focused on individual characteristics such as rural 
background, education, age, and gender, they have not addressed the role of individual 
motivation and personal norms. Yet, different strands of the literature indicate that such 
factors may have an important effect on career choice.  Deci (1975) was one of the first to 
recognize the role of professional commitment, or intrinsic motivation, while Dixit 
(1997; 2001) and Wilson (1989) emphasize its role in organizations and its importance 
for public service delivery.  Benabou and Tirole  also attribute a central role to intrinsic 
motivation and contrast it with motivation triggered by extrinsic incentives. 
5  Studies 
applied to the health sector also underline the importance of worker motivation .  In 
recognition of these findings, we will analyze and discuss the effect of individual 
motivation on the willingness to work in a rural area.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
characteristics of the data, how we collected the contingent valuation data and details of 
the survey.  Section 3 discusses the econometric strategy, while section 4 reports the 
results.  In section 5 we discuss the policy implications and carry out a simulation 
exercise. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The Ethiopian Context and the Cohort Survey 
The cohort survey was implemented in Ethiopia, a country with some of the worst 
health outcomes in the world.
6 With the majority of the population living in rural areas , 
and with substantial urban-rural disparities in living standards - the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (2000) indicates that average annual household expenditure in 
urban areas is almost twice that in rural areas (CSA & ORC Macro, 2001) - the health 
challenges are particularly severe in the rural areas.
 Endeavours to meet these challenges 
are hampered by the limited nature of health resources. Public spending is very low: in a 
recent report per capita health expenditures are estimated at around 4 USD or 25 USD 
PPP, which is significantly lower than the Sub-Sahara Africa average of 42 USD or 89 
USD PPP.
7 Moreover, Ethiopia not only has a very low number of health workers per 
capita - on average 11 nurses and 2 physcians per 100,000 inhabitants, which is low even 
                                                 
5 They define intrinsic motivation as the desire to perform a task for its own sake, while extrinsic 
motivation refers to rewards that are contingent on behaviour or outcomes. Their work can be seen as a 
refinement of Kreps (1997), who suggested that in many cases what is referred to as intrinsic incentives 
may in fact be workers’ response fuzzy extrinsic motivators, such as fears of discharge, although he also 
acknowledged an important role for ‘genuine’ intrinsic motivation 
6 Respiratory infection, diarrhea, malnutrition, and malaria contribute to high levels of infant and child 
mortality (estimated at 113 and 171 respectively for 2002, below regional averages for Sub-Saharan Africa) 
(UNICEF, 2003). Limited access to family planning and maternity care, as well as poor quality of these 
services also contribute to high levels of maternal mortality. For a detailed discussion of health outcomes 
and the Ethiopian health system more broadly, see World Bank .  
7 This is the estimated average for the 1990s World Bank (2004).    
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for African standards - but also a distribution of health workers that is biased towards 
urban areas.
8  
Health workers in Ethiopia face a labor market with specific characteristics.  Most 
important is the central role of the government. Wages are set by policy makers and 
therefore may not reflect the market value of labor.  The government also plays a direct 
role in the allocation of health workers.
9 Students who have been funded by the 
government – which is the vast majority - have an obligation to serve time working for 
the funding government agency (regional or federal) and are randomly allocated to posts 
through a lottery, with those funded by a regional government allocated to a post in that 
region.
10    Although the allocated job cannot be changed in principle, we find evidence 
that students bend the rules.
11  Only after having served the obligatory term in a 
government facility can health workers receive a release certificate from the public 
sector.  This certificate is legally required to work in the private health sector. Private 
facilities at the clinic level are now common place, but only in urban areas. In general, 
the Ethiopian health sector is dominated by the public sector - except for the pharmacies 
and drug shops. 
12 
Our analysis is based on a survey with final year nursing and medical students in 
their last year of study. The sample includes 219 nursing and 90 medical students, 
sampled from eight clinical nursing schools and three medical faculties all over the 
country.
13 The nursing students were in the final year of their training while the medical 
students were about to enter their internship. Our sample of medical students represents 
49% of the 2003/4 cohort, while our sample of nursing students represents an estimated 
16% of the 2003/4 cohort. The statistical analysis is based on data from three sources: (i) 
a self-administered (supervised) questionnaire which included contingent valuation 
questions; (ii) a medical knowledge test; and, (iii) data from two behavioral games.
14 As 
set out in the introduction, two major challenges are to measure the willingness to work 
                                                 
8 There are no detailed figures available for the urban – rural distribution, but from partial analysis it is 
clear that the distribution is biased in favour of urban areas . Data from the survey used in this paper 
suggests indeed that 67% of nursing students and 92% of doctors prefer to work in an urban area in the 
long term. In the context of Ethiopia this implies a strong preference for Addis Ababa. 
9 The role of the public sector, both for wage setting and in the allocation of health workers also motivate 
the use contingent valuation in the Ethiopian context. 
10 Students from private schools formally do not have an obligation.  But private for profit schools are a 
very new phenomon (Only one school is listed to transfer from pre-accredition to full license; the school is 
part of ths sample- all the others remain pre-accredited), and students from non-profit schools often 
partcipate in the lottery. 
11 Close to sixty percent state that they can get their first posting changed; about seventy percent will swap 
their posting, and over twenty percent would consider to pay for a swap. None of these activities are legal. 
12 Seventy-one percent of hospitals, 94 % of health centers, 82 % percent of health stations and all health 
posts are currently run by the government. In contrast 80% of pharmacies, drug shops and rural drug 
vendors are privately owned.  
13Details on the sampling strategy are provided in the appendix.  We focus on clinical nurses and midwifes 
who attended 2 years of nursing school. 
14 Detailed information on the survey and the survey instruments can be found in Serneels et al (2005).    
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in a rural area and individual motivation.  In the remainder of this section, we focus on 
the contingent valuation questions and the measurement of motivation. 
In the past there has been controversy over how to measure contingent valuations 
properly.
15  For this reason a committee of experts, appointed by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), following the Exxon Valdes incident, was 
asked to produce a report on best practice for reliable contingent valuation.
16  The basic 
conclusions of the NOAA Committee can be summarized as follows: (i) use probability 
sampling; (ii) avoid mail surveys; (iii) interview people in a place that is related to the 
question analyzed in the contingent valuation survey; (iv) formulate the question in a 
specific and realistic context; and (v) use closed-end questions or a variant thereof.  In 
writing our instruments we follow NOAA recommendations as close as possible. First, 
although the schools are selected by convenience sampling, the students in each school 
were selected randomly. Second, the questionnaires were administered in the schools, and 
were filled out in the presence of members of the team. Third, the contingent valuation 
question was specific and the context was realistic. The salary of reference is the actual 
salary of health workers when they start their career. In addition since students are close 
to their graduation, it is very likely that they have already thought about the issue before 
participating in the survey. Finally, since the sample size is small we use a "payment 
card" type of question.
17 The question is the following: 
 
Imagine that when you finish your studies you get two jobs as a health worker in the public 
sector, one in Addis Ababa and one in a rural area 500 km from Addis Ababa. Both 
contracts are for at least 3 years. Your monthly salary for the job in Addis Ababa would be 




                                                 
15 Diamond and Hausman argue that contingent valuation responses are often not consistent with economic 
theory. However, as pointed out by Hanemann , most of these criticisms are the consequence of an 
improperly designed survey. 
16 The committee was co-chaired by Arrow and Solow and included Leamer, Portney, Radner and 
Schuman. Portney  presents a complete description of the basic recommendations of the NOAA 
Committee. 
17 Contingent valuation questions can take three basic forms: open-ended, closed-ended (also called 
referendum) and "payment card". The typical open-end question take the form "What is the most you 
would be willing to pay for ...?". However, experimental evidence has shown that this formulation has a 
high hypothetical bias .  Closed-ended questions ask individuals for their willingness to pay a particular 
amount of money (x dollars). In general respondents are presented with a random value and have to answer 
yes or no. If there is only one question, this is called a single-bound closed-ended question. More 
sophisticated versions use a follow up question phrased in the same terms but offering a higher (or lower) 
amount depending on the answer of the individual (this is called double bound)  .  The "payment card" goes 
one step further and asks the individual to answer yes or no for a list of different amounts. 
18 One Birr is approximately 0.125 USD.    
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This question is repeated for a range of salaries, with $ taking the value of 600, 
700, 800, 900, 1000 and 1200 respectively, and is asked both for a rural (200 km from 
Addis Ababa) and remote postings (500 km from Addis Ababa). For medical students the 
basic salaries are 1200, 1300, 1500, 1700, 1900 and 2100.  Figure 1 plots the cumulative 
distribution for the contingent valuation of the choice of rural versus urban posting for 
alternative wages for nurses.  As expected the cumulative distribution for a rural post 
(200 km from Addis Ababa) dominates the distribution for a remote post (500 km away 
from Addis Ababa). Focusing on the contingent valuation wages for the remote area, 
500km from Addis Ababa, the graph illustrates that at the current monthly wage of 700 
Birr, about one-third of the starting nurses are willing to work in a remote area. As the 
rural wage increases, the number of nurses willing to work in a remote area rises, but not 
in a linear way.  Beyond 1,000 Birr, marginal take up decreases.  Figure 2 plots the 
density function of the reservation wage to work in a rural area for nursing and medical 
students separately.  The distribution for nurses is bimodal, that for medical students 
heavily skewed to the left. 
19  
Another methodological challenge concerns the measurement of personal 
motivation. Although it has received increasing attention from a theoretical point of view, 
there is no clear agreement on how to measure it. Even when we focus on health work, 
the multi dimensional nature of motivation implies difficulties to agree on a compact 
measure (see Franco, Bennett, & Kanfer, 2002). With this in mind, we take a pragmatic 
approach focusing on the context of the medical profession and rural posting.  In this 
context we expect the motivation to help the poor – equivalent to healing the most 
severely ill patients since health and income poverty are strongly related - to play an 
important role.  
20  The variable we use is based on a pre-coded survey question about the 
relative importance of different job attributes. All listed attributes are at least partially 
driven by extrinsic motivation (career concerns, salary, etc.), with the exception of 
‘opportunity to help the poor’. The intrinsic motivation variable is then constructed as a 
dummy variable indicating that ‘opportunity to help the poor’ is ranked highest. Because 
our analysis indicates that this variable is an important determinant of willingness to 
work in a rural area, we also look at what determines an individual’s willingness to serve 
the poor and endeavor to explore the extent to which it might be possible to influence 
such motivations.  
 
                                                 
19 The validity of the reservation wages obtained from contingent valuation is supported by two additional 
results.  To capture the long term preference and expectation of the students with respect to urban or rural 
posting, we asked two more questions: whether the long term preference is to work in an urban or rural 
area; and what they think their employment situation will be in five years. The answers to both questions 
are highly corelated with the reservation wages obtained from contingent valuation with as correlation 
coefficients  -0.43 and -0.83 respectively.
  
20 Agreement on the importance of this norm is of course best reflected in the Hyppocratic Oath: ‘treat the 
sick to the best of one’s ability’.       
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3.  Econometric Methods 
The econometric analysis of contingent valuation data depends on the chosen 
formulation of the question. The choice between closed-ended questions or "payment 
cards" depends on several factors. Because of its specific nature closed-ended 
questionnaires "eat up" a lot of data. Since the identification of an effect rests on the 
random amounts offered to different individuals, one needs a large sample to achieve 
statistically significant effects. For similar reasons, the results are more likely to be 
misleading when a single closed-ended question approach is applied to a small sample.
21 
When an open ended question is used, the result is usually analyzed by regressing 
the contingent valuation on a set of explanatory variables using OLS.  We will use this 
approach as a benchmark. To analyze the answers from closed-ended questions, 
researchers initially used to run a simple logit or probit model where the explanatory 
variable was the offer, or the log of the offer. However Cameron and James (1987) show 
that there is an important difference between the traditional logit/probit model and the 
dichotomous choice generated by a closed-ended questionnaire. In particular, while in the 
traditional logit (probit), the  s β′  and the σ  cannot be identified separately, this is 
possible in the statistical model generated by the closed-ended contingent valuation 
model. The reason is the following. Imagine that we ask individuals to report their 
willingness to pay an amount of taxes T in order to enjoy a new national park. If they 
accept to pay that amount then   1 I = . Otherwise   0 I = . Then 
 
( ) 1P r | ii i i I TT x




i T  is the unobserved upper limit of the willingness-to-pay of individual i. The 
willingness to pay is function of some variables which we can group under  xi . 
 
ii i Tx u β
∗′ = +        ( 1 . 2 )  
 
where  ui  follows a normal distribution. By the usual reasoning in probit models then 
 
() ( ) Pr | Pr Pr 1
ii i i i
ii i i i i
uT x T x






>= + > => = − Φ ⎢ ⎥⎢⎥
⎣ ⎦⎣⎦
 (1.3) 
                                                 
21 Cameron and Huppert  use a simulation to generate single closed-ended responses from a "payment card" 
questionnaire. They conclude that the results from single threshold open-ended questions are substantially 
different from to the ones obtained from using all the information from the "payment card". Their evidence 
suggests that if using a single closed ended question, a very large sample is required to achieve the level of 




Since  i T   is the value of the offer, we can identify the parameter of  Ti  as -1 / σ   
and the parameters of the x's as   / β σ . Since invariance is one of the properties of the 
ML estimator we can transform the coefficients to obtain the parameters we are interested 
in.  The calculation of the standard deviation of the parameters β is a little more 
convoluted. There are basically two alternative approaches: either one can estimate a 
simple probit and use the Delta method to calculate the standard error of the transformed 
coefficients; or one can program the likelihood function and use a non-linear 
maximization routine to obtain estimates of β and the standard deviation σ 
22. 
Below we develop a framework for analyzing our particular case. For each row in 
the payment card – or each salary w1, the individual can choose between accepting the 
offer to go to a rural post, rp = 1, or not accepting the offer, rp = 0. Assuming that the 
indirect utility function is   (,; ) vr pwx  where  w  is the salary offered and  x  represents 
other variables that shift the function. For nurses, who have reference salary of 700, we 
therefore get 
 
() ( ) () () ( ) ( ) 10 1 Pr 1| Pr 1, ; 0,700; ; rp x v w x v x F v F w ζζ β == − > − = − Δ = Δ (1.4) 
 
Where   0 ζ  and  1 ζ  are error terms. For simplicity we further assume that the function 
reflecting the difference in indirect utility has a log-linear specification, 
 
 
( ) ln vw x δ β ′ Δ= Δ +       ( 1 . 5 )  
 
where x includes variables like age, education, income, etc.  However in the payment 
card type of question an individual can choose the threshold that represents an offer 
exceeding the reservation salary from many different options. Therefore the probability 
that the willingness to accept the offer lies in the interval   1 [, ) mm ww +  is given by 
 
() ( ) () ( )( ) ( ) 01 1 01 Pr( 1) Pr 1, ; 0,700; Pr 1, ; 0,700; mm m rp v w x v x v w x v x ζ ζζ ζ − = = −> − − −> −
          () ( ) 1 ;; mm Fw Fw ββ − =−       ( 1 . 6 )  
 
                                                 
22Depending on the nonlinear optimization one can use the evaluation of the Hessian or the evaluation of 
the product of the gradients as a consistent estimator of the information matrix.    
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When we do this for each row (salary), we get a recursive probit model.  The parameters 
of this model can be estimated using maximum likelihood, where the log-likelihood 
function is  
 





ln , ; , ; ; 1 ; ,
NM
mM
ii m m i M
im





=+ − + − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎩⎭ ∑∑
           ( 1 . 7 )  
With the indicator variable  Ii
m  taking the value 1 if individual  i accepts salary m but not 
salary  m-1.  The advantage of this estimation method is that it uses all the information 
provided by the "payment cards" and thus gives more robust results, and robustness can 
be verified since σ is estimated individually.  
 
4.  Empirical Results 
Before considering the estimation of the econometric specification of the previous 
section we present the results of OLS estimation that takes the reservation wage at which 
a post in a rural area is accepted as the dependent variable.   The independent variables 
include those normally included in a wage regression, like age, gender, a proxy for other 
household income, cognitive skills, as well as individual characteristics that possibly 
affect the willingness to work in a rural area like familiarity with rural areas, willingness 
to help the poor, ethnicity and religion.
23  We run the following the regression: 
 
 
01 2 3 4
56 7 8




ii i i i i
ii i
ii i
rw x u AGE FEMALE EXP TSCORE
ADDIS DIST HELPPOOR TIGRAY
CATHOL PROTEST DOCTOR u
β ββ β β β
ββ β β
ββ β
=+ = + + + +
++ + +
++ + +
   (1.8) 
 
where EXP is the expenditure of the household, TSCORE is the score in the medical tests 
(in percentage points), ADDIS is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student has a 
permanent address in the capital, DIST is the distance walking to primary school at age 
six,  HELPPOOR is our proxy for intrinsic motivation, and TIGRAY, CATHOL and 
PROTEST are dummy variables that characterize the ethnicity and religion of the student. 
The descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
Since our subjects are students, 90% of whom have never worked before, we use 
an estimate of expenditures of the parental household, EXP, as a proxy for other 
                                                 




 24  We use the method suggested by Grosh and Baker  and Ahmed and 
Bouis  to predict parental household expenditure.  In our questionnaire we included 
questions on asset ownership drawn from the Household Income Expenditure and 
Welfare Monitoring Survey (HICE/WMS) 2000, a nationally representative survey, 
conducted by the Central Statistical Authority (CSA), which collects detailed data on 
household consumption and expenditures.  By regressing household consumption on 
household assets, we obtained coefficients to predict household consumption for the 






EXP D u α
=
=+ ∑ on the HICE/WMS 2000 data to obtain estimates of 
a ˆ α , the 
coefficient for each asset, which we then use to predict  
i EXP  for our own sample.
 25  The 
regression has an R
2 of 0.17.  The average student comes from a household with 
predicted annual expenditures of 6,606 Birr (777 USD), which corresponds to monthly 
expenditures of 550 Birr (65 USD) or daily expenditures of 18 Birr (2 USD).  The mean 
estimated household expenditure for our sample is slightly higher than the mean for the 
entire population, which is 5,403 Birr (635 USD) per year.  
 
To get an insight whether poorer qualified health students are more likely to serve 
in a rural area, we conducted a medical knowledge test. The variable TSCORE is the 
score on this test, expressed as a percentage.
26  ADDIS and DIST capture the individual’s 
familiarity with rural areas.  Students who grew up or whose parents are still living in a 
rural area may be more likely to go back.   
 
As set out in section 2, the variable willingness to help the poor is our proxy for 
intrinsic motivation.  It is an indicator variable for ranking ‘opportunity to help the poor’ 
as the most important characteristic.  Using this definition, we find that 26 percent of the 
health workers has high intrinsic motivation (see Table 1) 
 
                                                 
24 We also considered a variable for own current expenditures, constructed as the first component from 
principal component analysis on the students’ ownership of assets like watch, radio, tv, bicycle, 
refrigerator, etc, but this variable had no statistically significant effect in any of the estimations.   
25 Where Di represents a dummy variable that the asset is present in the household. The regression uses 
population weights as calculated by the Central Statistical Authority. Since the estimates of the coefficients 
are quite sensitive to outliers, we exclude the richest 10% of households in our prediction and only consider 
household with expenditures equal or below 10,000 Birr (1,176 USD) per year.   
26 We would like to thank Agnes Soucat, Gebreselassie Okubaghzi and the team of health professionals 
from Addis Ababa University who designed the test. The tests are different for the nursing and medical 
students – with  some overlap – and contained 52 multiple choice questions to be answered in 30 minutes.  
The test contains two parts: (i) knowledge of evidence based medicine; and (ii) technical knowledge on 
how to deliver medical interventions. In the first part they are asked to identify the effectiveness of specific 
interventions on a) child mortality, b) maternal mortality, c) malaria, and d) illness due to HIV and 
tuberculosis in Ethiopia. In the second part they are asked knowledge questions about medical facts and 
interventions. Each correct answer was given the same weight, and the final score is the sum of the correct 
replies, expressed as a percentage.     
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Table 2 shows the results of a simple OLS regression of the log of reservation 
wages to work in a remote area (500 km from Addis) on individual characteristics.
 27 The 
first two columns show the results for nursing students only, while columns three and 
four report the results for nursing and medical students together. The results in the first 
two columns indicate that the reservation wage is lower the older the individual and the 
higher his intrinsic motivation. In contrast, coming from a wealthier family and having a 
permanent address in Addis Ababa imply a higher reservation wage, although 
significance of the latter is unstable.
 28  Being catholic tends to lower reservation wages, 
but the result is also unstable.  Columns 3 and 4 show that the estimation results for the 
sample including both nursing and medical students are very similar.
29  The dummy for 
doctors is significantly different from zero indicating that doctors have a significant 
higher reservation wage to accept a post in rural areas.   
 
Table 3 reports the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the payment 
cards as set out in equation (1.7).
30  Columns 1 and 2 show the results for nursing 
students only, and columns 3 and 4 for nursing and medical students together.  Two 
variables are highly significant (1% level): expenditures of the parents’ household (EXP) 
and willingness to help the poor (HELPPOOR), our proxy for intrinsic motivation.  The 
first indicates that students coming from better off households are less likely to want to 
work in a rural area presumably because they can afford to be more choosy about a job, 
not facing a binding budget constraint.  The second result suggests that students who 
have higher intrinsic motivation are more likely to work in a rural area.     
 
A further interesting result is that although women tend to be less likely to want to 
work in a rural area – a fact usually explained as being related to personal safety concerns 
of women in rural and isolated areas – the effect is not significant when controlling for 
other characteristics.   
 
We find no evidence that less skilled health workers - those with lower test 
results- self-select into working in rural areas. However, being more familiar with rural 
areas increases one’s willingness to work there, but only weakly: having a permanent 
personal address in Addis Ababa decreases the reservation wage to work in a rural area 
                                                 
27 The model passes tests for homoscedasticity and omitted variable. When we include interaction terms of 
each variable with medical student, none of them is significant.   
28 To see whether the left and right censoring of our data affects the results we also run a Tobit model, a 
Censored Least Absoulte Deviation (CLAD) model and trimming models confirm the results of the least 
squares estimation. 
29 Additional estimations results (not shown in table 2) point out that the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are not different for doctors and nurses with the exception of the dummy variable and, in some 
cases, the age. Results are available upon request. 
30 Estimation was performed using nonlinear routiunes in TSP 4.5.  We tried including interaction terms 
between each of the variables and medical student, but none of them is significant.     
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and is significant at the 10% level; and distance from school at age 12 does not show up 
significant.  
 
Tigray tend to be less likely to work in rural areas, but the coefficient is not 
significant.
31  Catholics are more likely to have a preference for working in rural areas, 
but, as we will see later, this may be because they attend a (catholic) NGO nursing school 
that encourages them to do so.  Other religions have no effect.  
 
As pointed out earlier, one of the advantages of maximum likelihood estimation 
of the payment cards is that the standard deviation σ is estimated separately.  It is 
interesting to note that the estimate of  σ is very stable across specifications, also 
indicating that the results are robust.    
 
To summarize, the results indicate that household expenditures and intrinsic 
motivation are the most important explanatory factors of health students’ preferences for 
a rural posting, and that medical students have a stronger preference for urban jobs 
compared to nursing students.  
 
Who wants to serve the poor? 
How do we interpret the importance of wanting to help the poor, our proxy for 
intrinsic motivation, and what are the policy implications? The question of interest is 
whether intrinsic motivation is predetermined or whether it can be shaped: Is motivation 
malleable and a result of socialization? And if it is, at what stage does socialization have 
an impact: during childhood or professional training?  Although our data are by no means 
rich enough to address this question in a conclusive way, they give some indications.  We 
analyze how our proxy for intrinsic motivation is related to a number of psycho-social 
individual characteristics, using the following specification. 
 
(, , ,, , ,
,2 , , , , ; )
iiii i i i
ii i i i i i
HELPPOOR AGE FEMALE CATHOL DIST CHILDHW PARENT
INTEGRITY TRUST INITIAT RECIPR JUDGFAIR DOCTOR ζ
=Φ
           ( 1 . 9 )  
 
The variables that are not listed in Table 1 are described in Table 4, which also 
reports their descriptive statistic.   The variable CHILDHW   is a variable indicating 
                                                 
31 The likely explanation is that we surveyed schools outside Tigray, and the Tigray attending these schools 
may be more likely to be sent to a rural area outside their home region, where the population speaks a 
different language and a Tigray health worker is thus more isolated.       
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whether the child wanted become a health worker at age 12 or not, while PARENT 
indicates whether the parents had an influence on the decision to become a health worker.   
To investigate the importance psychosocial characteristics, we also included 
several psychosocial characteristics captured by series of questions during the survey. 
The variables and reliability of the scales constructed for the student responses are listed 
in Table 5. The first construct, INTEGRITY, reflects the extent to which the students 
disapprove of individuals accepting pay for more hours than they worked or 
reimbursement for more than actual expenses.
32 Table 5 shows that with a Cronbach-
Alpha of 0.70, the scale is quite reliable.  Somewhat less reliable is the variable based on 
past trusting behaviour. We use the measure suggested by Glaeser, Liabson, Scheinkman 
and Soutter .  The Cronbach-Alpha for TRUST1 is 0.42. If we reduce the items to the first 
two we obtain TRUST2, for which the Cronbach-Alpha raises to 0.51. To measure 
initiative we calculate the interitem correlation of three questions. The items for INITIAT 
also show a moderate level of reliability (Cronbach-Alpha=0.47).   
Another approach to investigate the importance of psychosocial characteristics is 
to measure the individual’s behavior in a game.  We played two behavioral games with 
the subjects: a generalized trust game and a third party punishment game. The first 
measures generalised trust while the second measures the individual’s judgement of 
fairness.  The games are explained in detail in the appendix.
33 In the first game the 
subject receives an amount x from player A and passes any portion of this amount on to 
Player C.  The student’s behavior in the game reflects trustworthiness to an unknown 
party or what is called generalized reciprocity.  There is strong evidence for the role of 
reciprocity in labor market choices and performance, both from lab experiments   as well 
as from combining survey and experimental data .  The game was selected because the 
extent to which the students respond positively to being entrusted with resources in the 
game may be a predictor of their response to being entrusted with public resources in real 
life. Thus, it might act as a proxy for their preference for or behavior in public service.  
We therefore expect that individuals with higher intrinsic motivation behave more 
reciprocal in the generalized trust game.    
 
The second game is the Third Party Punishment Game as set out by Fehr and Fischbacher 
.  In this game Player 1 can give any share of a received amount to Player 2; while Player 
3 can impose a fine on Player 1 when she judges his behavior to be unfair.  How much 
Player 3 is willing to pay to punish Player 1 is a direct measure of the strength of their 
                                                 
32 The items were taken from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) which has been used in research 
activities during the last 40 years and is very appropriate to use with students (see 
http://www.cps.nova.edu/rcpphelp/CPI.html)  
33 The games are anonymous and follow the standard procedures of experimental economics (they are 
played in a classroom, for real money, and follow a precise script).    
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negative reaction to an act of unfairness.  Our sample of health students played the role of 
Player 3.  We expect that the judgement of (un)fairness is positively related to intrinsic 
motivation: those who have a strong judgement about distributional fairness, are more 
likely to help the poor.  
The results of estimating the probit model in equation (1.9) are reported in Table 
6.  Columns 1 and 2 report the result for nursing students only, while columns 3 and 4 
include both nursing and medical students. One result stands out: women have higher 
levels of intrinsic motivation.  Those of catholic religion also tend to have higher intrinsic 
motivation, but the significance of the result is not robust and it seems to be driven by 
their attendance of an NGO nursing school. However, this effect is not robust, especially 
when limiting our sample to the nursing students, which are the only ones who have a 
choice to attend an NGO school or not.
34    JUDGFAIR has a positive effect, but is only 
significant at the 10% level and becomes insignificant when we control for the NGO 
school. This suggests that NGO schools influence their students in their adherence to 
norms of fairness and distributive justice, which leads them to want to help the poor.    
Our data do not allow us to further unravel the effect of FEMALE, and determine 
in how far this effect is due to inherent characteristics, or whether it is the result of gender 
socialization.  Other variables that are related to the individual’s identity like AGE and 
CHIDLHW, are insignificant
35, as are variables related to the social environment where 
the individual grew up, like DIST and PARENT or received professional training 
(SCHOOLNGO).  Our psycho-social constructs and behavioural measures also show up 
insignificant in the probit.  Neither initiative or integrity nor trust seems to help 
explaining willingness to help the poor. Generalized reciprocity is also not significant, 
while the relationship between judgement of fairness and willingness to help the poor is 
sometimes weakly significant (10%), but the result is not robust.   This suggests that 
more reciprocal individuals do not necessarily have higher intrinsic motivation, while 
those with higher judgment of fairness may have higher intrinsic motivation.
 We find no 
evidence that nurses are more willing to help the poor than doctors. 
36 
                                                 
34 All medical faculties are state owned.  If the effect of NGO school would be stronger, it would trigger the 
question whether the school socializes the students to higher intrinsic motivation or whether the most 
motivated students self-select into this school.  Unfortunately the data does not allow us to draw any 
conclusion on this.  
35 Identity can be defined as a person’s sense of self through identification with a group. Akerlof and 
Kranton  illustrate how identity can affect interactions with others as well as career decisions. 
36 Since in both games we use the strategy method, we obtain a reciprocity function and punishment 
function for each individual.  We use the median of this function to proxy reciprocal and fining behaviour.  
We tried different summary measures, but all give a similar result; i.e. none is robustly significant, although 
the fining measures tend to perform better than the reciprocity measures.  However, the use of experimental 
measures combined with surveys is young and therefore it remains hypothetical which conclusions we can 
draw from the lack of signficnace in relationship.  An alternative interpretation is that the measures 
obtained from the behavioural game are rather imprecise, i.e. they have a high standard error.  This is 




Summarized the results underline the importance of gender for willingness to help 
the poor, our proxy for intrinsic motivation.   
 
The preference for an urban job 
As set out in the introduction, we find that about two-thirds of the nursing and 90 
percent of the medical students prefer to work in an urban area in the long run.  So far we 
have concentrated on the individual characteristics that determine why new health 
workers do or do not want to work in a rural area and we have paid little attention to the 
job attributes associated with an urban or rural posting.  What job attributes make the 
urban sector so attractive?  To see this we model the premium to work in a rural area 
(reservation wage – the reference wage) on variables indicating the rank of the job 
characteristics by each individual.  
37  Since the choice is between two public sector jobs, 
job stability and salary are the same (by design) and do not enter the equation.  We focus 
on the individual evaluation of the following job characteristics: promotion opportunities 
(PROMO), access to other income opportunities (OTHINC), access to good education for 
children (EDU), access to good health care (HEALTHC), physical conditions of the work 
place (WORKPL), and access to further training (TRAINING).  Table 1 reports the 
descriptive statistics for these variables.  The model we use is very simple:   
 




P PROMO OTHINC EDU HEALTHC
WORKPL TRAINING DOCTOR X u
β ββ β β
ββ β
=+ + + +
++ ++ +
             (1.10) 
 
The explanation and descriptive statistics for the job attributes are listed in Table 
1. P is the premium required by an individual to work in a rural area. X are the individual 
characteristics included in the model described by equation (1.9). The premium follows 
the same distribution as the reservation wage, plotted in Figure 2. About one-third of 
nursing students are willing to work in a rural area at the reference wage (premium zero), 
while two-thirds require a premium; while only a small minority of the medical students 
are ready to work in a rural area at a wage below the reference wage.   
 
Table 7 shows the results for estimation of equation (1.10). The first column 
reports the results from OLS estimation for nurses only
38, while column two reports the 
results for both doctors and nurses. Because the variables are not measured in absolute 
                                                 
37 The information on job characteristics comes from two questions.  We asked students to rank a set of 
reasons why they would prefer to work in an urban or rual area; we also use the questions where we ask to 
rank job attributes in general.  
38 Estimation by 2-sided tobit  gives similar results    
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units, the usual coefficients have no interpretation; we therefore report the x-standardized 
coefficients. A large x-standardized coefficient indicates a high relative importance of the 
underlying variable.    
 
The individual evaluations of three attributes are significant:  access to education 
for children, promotion opportunities, and access to training, although the latter is only 
significant when including medical students.  Access to education for children has the 
highest significance and the highest x-standardized coefficient, indicating that it is the 
most important attribute. ‘Opportunities for promotion’ has the second highest coefficient 
for nursing students, and comes third when including doctors, but it remains highly 
significant.  Access to training seems especially relvant for medical students.  The results 
confirm those from qualitative research reporting that health workers ‘fear to get stuck in 
a rural area’, but it also shows that reasons beyond professional isolation are important, 
namely the living conditions for their families.  
 
5.  Policy Implications and Simulation 
In this section we carry out a simple simulation to quantify how much it would 
cost to get a target number of health workers in rural areas.  In the introduction we saw 
that Ethiopia has one of the lowest health worker / population ratios.  The government is 
well aware of this and has invested substantially in human resources for health over the 
last years.  The number of nurses has increased from 4,744 in 1998 to 12,838 in 2002, 
while the number of physicians has increased from 1,415 to 1,888 over the same period.
39 
Data on the urban-rural distribution of different categories of health workers are limited, 
but a recent report suggests a strong imbalance in favor of urban areas. We carry out 
some simulations. First we determine how much premium health workers have to be paid 
to take up a post in a rural area. Then we calculate how much it would cost to make the 
entire current cohort of starting nurses and doctors choose to work in a rural area. Finally 
we calculate how much it would cost to make all starting nurses and doctors take up a 
rural posting when doubling the health work force over five years. 
40  
 
We make two assumptions. First, that health workers can choose freely where to 
work;   they are offered the choice between two contracts:  work in an urban area and 
earn the base salary (contract U), or work in a rural area and earn a higher salary (base 
salary + premium, contract R).  We also assume that our sample reflects the distribution 
                                                 
39 The figure for nurses includes all categories of nurses, including junior nurses with one year of 
education. 
40 It is usefull to keep in mind that we only look at clinical nurse students (incl midwifes) with at least two 
year professional training, and medical students at the start of their internship.  This excludes nurses with 
one year of training and health officers.  The figures on the increase in nurses contains all categories of 
nurses, including junior nurses with one year of education.     
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of characteristics of the entire cohort of health workers (in household background, 
intrinsic motivation, etc.), which seems realsitic given our sampling approach.   
The simulation has of course many limitations, and its aim is to illustrate the 
implications of our findings rather than providing precise policy advice.  It is for example 
usefull to keep in mind that our anlaysis is restricted to clinical nursing students 
(including midwives) with at least two years of professional training and medical students 
at the start of their internship. Nurses with one year of training and health officers are 
excluded from the analysis. Also, the contingent valuation is for 500 km from Addis 
Ababa, while remote postings may be further away (although they are often closer to 
regional capital).   
We saw in Figure 1 that at the current monthly wage of 700 Birr, about one-third 
of the starting nurses are willing to work in a remote area.  Using equation (1.8) to predict 
the reservation wage, we find that to get 100% of the starting nurses in rural areas, a 
salary of 1,019 Birr per month is needed, while to get all new doctors take up a rural post, 
they need to be paid a salary of 2,296 Birr per month.  This would imply an salary 
increase of 319 Birr per month, or 31%, for nurses and 896 Birr per month, or 39%, for 
doctors, relative to the reference salary used in the contingent valuation.   
To get the entire current cohort of nurses and doctors (1,378 nurses and 192 
doctors) choose contract R, i.e. work in a rural area, the health budget has to increase 
with 7,337,454 Birr per year, or 863,230 USD per year, an increase of 0.9% per annum. 
What would it cost to get all starting nurses and doctors work in a rural area when 
doubling the health workforce over a period of five years, i.e. increase the number of 
nurses and doctors from the current 8,572 nurses and 1,888 doctors to 17,144 nurses and 
3,776 doctors? For simplicity we assume that the salary remains constant over the first 
five years.  We find that the health budget has to increase in total with 7.9% per year, of 
which 5.2% per year to cover the basic salary for the extra work force, and 2.7% per year 
to cover the premium to make them take up a rural posting.  
In column 2 of Table 8 we carry out the same thought experiments, but now 
assuming that all nurses and doctors have high intrinsic motivation, i.e. want to help the 
poor. We find that the budget increase needed to get the current cohort of nurses and 
doctors working in rural areas reduces to 0.7%.  To make all starting nurses and doctors 
take up a rural post while doubling the work force over five years, one needs a budget 
increase of 2% when all health workers are highly motivated.   
 
Increasing the number of female health workers (to 75% of nurses and 50% of 
doctors female), while keeping the above assumptions, is slightly more expensive, as 
shown in column 3 of Table 8. (The cost reducing effect of womens’ higher intrinsic    
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motivation is compensated by the cost increasing effect of women requiring higher 
reservation wages to work in a rural area.)    
Attracting more students from rural areas, would also reduce the required budget 
increase slightly, as reported in column 4 of Table 8. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the willingness to work in a rural area of final year nursing 
and medical students in Ethiopia.  We use contingent valuation data, obtained from 
"payment cards" questions.  We find that there are two main determinants of the 
willingness to work in a rural area: the income of the parents’ household and the 
students’ willingness to help the poor. The first result is in line with results from labor 
economics which show that income from other household members affects labor 
decisions (Mroz, 1987). The second result indicates that a health worker’s intrinsic 
motivation has a strong influence on her preference for a rural posting. We also find that 
medical students are less likely than nursing students to prefer to work in a rural area. 
The results are very robust: they are very similar when using OLS estimation or when 
using maximum likelihood estimation that uses the full information of the "payment 
card". The latter method also allows a direct estimate of the standard deviation, which 
appears to be constant across different specifications, a further sign of the robustness of 
the results.    
Given the high significance of the variable, we attempt to further unravel who is 
motivated to help the poor. Behind it is the question whether intrinsic motivation is 
predetermined or whether it can be shaped -  i.e. whether motivated health workers are a 
result of socialization or selection. If intrinsic motivation is an internalization of norms, 
as argued by Deci (1975) a central question for public policy is when internalization takes 
place: before they enter the profession or after.  Our data are by no means rich enough to 
address this question in a conclusive way, but give some indication.  The key result is that 
women are significantly more likely to want to help the poor than men, but we cannot 
determine whether this is due to inherent differences or has come about through 
socialization.  Having attended an NGO school also has an effect, although this is less 
significant.  It may suggest that health students attending an NGO school are socialized 
towards helping the poor or that the prospective health students with high intrinsic 
motivation self-select into NGO schools. Other psycho-social characteristics seem to 
have limited effect.   
Since two-thirds of the nursing students and 90 percent of the medical students 
want to work in an urban area in the long run, we investigate what makes an urban job so 
attractive.  Analyzing the premium to work in a rural area, we find that this is explained 
especially by access to education for children and promotion opportunities. For doctors    
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access to further training seems to play an important role as well.  This confirms results 
from qualitative research reporting that health workers ‘fear to get stuck in a rural area’, 
but also indicates that reasons related to the living conditions of health workers’ families 
are important. It also points at potential alternative strategies for the government to attract 
health workers to rural areas. Instead of raising salaries, improving access to further 
training may increase health workers’ willingness to take up a rural posting.  Currently, 
there exists virtually no training or continued education for health professionals in 
Ethiopia (International Council of Nurses, 2002).  
To make the policy implications explicit we carry out a simple thought 
experiment, where starting nurses and doctors can choose between two contracts: an 
urban post with basic salary or a rural post where they receive basic salary plus premium.  
The main message of this simulation is that it does not have to be very expensive to get 
all starting health workers to take up a rural post, even when the aim is to double the 
health workforce. This suggests an alternative approach to the current job ‘lottery’, where 
health workers are officially not able to choose, but where some seem to manage better 
than others to influence the outcome of the ‘lottery’.  
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  Figure 2: Density function of reservation wages to work in a rural post 
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  Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  Mean 
Individual characteristic:    
AGE  Age of the individual  23 
FEMALE  Dummy variable indicating whether the individual is female  0.36 
EXP  Predicted annual household consumption of parental hh  6,606 Birr
* 
ADDIS  Indicator variable for living in Addis Ababa  0.25 
DIST  Distance walking to primary school at age 6 (in minutes)  30 
TSCORE  Score on medical knowledge test  0.49 
HELPPOOR  Indicator variable that ‘opportunity to help the poor’ is most 
important job characteristic 
0.26 
TIGRAY  Dummy variable indicating ethnicity is Tigray  0.06 
CATHOL  Dummy variable indicating individual is of catholic religion  0.10 
PROTEST  Dummy variable indicating individual is of protestant religion  0.21 
DOCTOR  Dummy variable indicating individual is medical student  0.29 
    
Job attributes:    
PROMO    Dummy variable indicating promotion opportunities is the 
most important reason to prefer to work in rural or urban area 
0.27 
OTHINC  Dummy variable indicating that access to other income 
opportunities is the most important reason to prefer to work in 
rural or urban area  
0.11 
EDU  Dummy variable indicating that access to good education for 
children is the most important reason to prefer to work in rural 
or urban area 
0.10 
HEALTHC  Dummy variable indicating access to good health care is the 
most important reason to prefer to work in rural or urban area 
0.12 
WORKPL  Dummy variable indicating good physical conditions of 
workplace is the most important job characteristic 
0.09 
TRAINING  Dummy variable indicating access to further training is the 
most important job characteristic 
0.32 
    
*or 777 USD
   ** maximum score is by construction 48 
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  Table 2: Least squares estimation of the log of the reservation wage to work in a rural area 
  Nursing students  Medical students 
       
AGE  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 
 (2.81)**  (2.23)*  (2.94)**  (2.08)* 
FEMALE  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03 
  (0.60) (0.63) (0.69)  (0.82) 
EXP (in 000)  0.04 0.04 0.03  0.03 
  (3.00)** (2.96)** (2.84)**  (2.74)** 
TSCORE  -0.21 -0.12 -0.16  -0.11 
  (0.85) (0.48) (0.79)  (0.54) 
ADDIS  0.11 0.11 0.07  0.07 
  (1.89)+ (1.96)+ (1.91)+  (1.91)+ 
DIST  (in  000)  -0.06 -0.16 -0.13  -0.24 
  (0.07) (0.21) (0.21)  (0.41) 
HELPPOOR  -0.17 -0.14 -0.14  -0.12 
  (3.65)** (2.84)** (3.93)**  (3.14)** 
TIGRAY   0.11    0.09 
   (1.12)   (1.34) 
CATHOL   -0.12   -0.14 
   (1.81)+   (2.44)* 
PROTEST   0.07    0.04 
   (1.35)   (1.00) 
DOCTOR     0.83  0.80 
     (16.22)**  (15.75)** 
Constant  7.03 6.91 7.03  6.92 
  (33.57)** (32.77)** (40.39)**  (39.59)** 
Observations  158 158 220  220 
R-squared  0.20 0.24 0.75  0.76 
       
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimation of the payment cards. 
  Nursing students  Medical students 

























































































         
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for psycho-social variables related to intrinsic motivation 
(HELPPOOR) 
Variable Description  Mean 
CHILDHW  Dummy variable indicating individual wanted to become 
health worker as a child 
0.66 
PARENT  Dummy variable indicating whether parents had influence 
on decision to become hw
a 
0.63 
INTEGRITY  Interitem correlation of answers to Q71 , Q72  4.01 
TRUST2  Interitem correlation of answers to Q73, Q74  2.79 
INITIAT  Interitem correlation of answers to Q64, Q65, Q67  2.08 
RECIPR  Experimental measure from generalised trust game  26 
FINING  Experimental measure from third party punishment game  3 
SCHOOLNGO  Dummy variable indicating whether school is private NGO  0.18 
a. Constructed from a question where they had to indicate agreement on a five point Likert scale with 




Table 5: Reliability of psychosocial constructs 
Construct #  Items  Items
a  α  
INTEGRITY  2  Q71 One should never allow oneself to be paid for more 
hours than worked 
0.70 
    Q72 One should never allow oneself to be reimbursed for 
more money than one actually spent on expenses 
 
TRUST1  3  Q73 How often do you lend money to your friends?  0.42 
    Q74 How often do you lend personal possessions to your 
friends (e.g. music, clothes, bicycle, etc.)? 
 
    Q75 How often do you intentionally leave the entrance 
door of the place where you live unlocked? 
 
TRUST2 2  Q73,Q74  0.51 
INITIAT  3  Q64 I use any opportunity to participate actively when 
there is something to do 
0.47 
    Q65 When I do a task, I normally do more than I am 
asked to do 
 
    Q67 If there is anything to do I usually take the initiative, 
even if others do not 
 
a. For Q64 – Q72 the respondent was presented with a 5-point LIkert scale containing disagree, 
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree; for Q73-74, the respondent 
could choose from five frequencies: more than once a week, about once a week, about once a 
month, once a year and never; for Q75 he could choose between very often, often, sometimes, 
rarely and never. 
 




Table 6: Probit intrinsic motivation on characteristics of individual and her environment 
(marginal effects) 




Nursing and medical students 
     
     
AGE  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  (1.17) (0.68) (1.05) (0.41) 
FEMALE  0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 
  (2.52)* (2.52)* (2.37)* (2.42)* 
CATHOL  0.25 0.12 0.20 0.05 
  (2.04)* (0.83) (1.91)+ (0.43) 
SCHOOLNGO   0.20  0.26 
   (1.74)+  (2.39)* 
DIST  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.78) (0.58) (0.79) (0.55) 
CHILDHW 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  (0.38) (0.32) (0.33) (0.23) 
PARENT 0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04 
  (0.08) (0.18) (0.41) (0.66) 
INTEGRITY  0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  (0.99) (0.73) (0.59) (0.30) 
TRUST2  0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.00 
  (1.30) (1.08) (0.12) (0.06) 
INITIAT  -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
  (1.36) (1.48) (1.53)  (1.68)+ 
RECIPR  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.38) (0.57) (0.17) (0.45) 
JUDGFAIR 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
  (1.82)+  (1.61) (1.44) (1.22) 
DOCTOR     -0.09  -0.04 
     (1.33)  (0.63) 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
 




  Table 7: The relationship premium - job characteristics: nurses 
  Nursing students  Nursing and medical students 
    
PROMO 49.35  43.06 
 (2.61)**  (2.66)** 
OTHINC 19.72  13.70 
 (1.11)  (0.84) 
EDU 61.87  51.65 
 (3.52)**  (3.33)** 
HEALTHC -12.84  -8.29 
 (0.65)  (-0.50) 
WORKPL -3.67  -3.27 
 (-0.19)  (-0.20) 
TRAINING 29.18  43.13 
 (1.45)**  (2.55)* 
R-squared 0.38  0.55 
Note: The reported coefficients are X-standardized coefficients; the coefficient for the constant is not 
reported. The regression includes aqll control variables included in the model in Table 3  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. 
  
  Table 8: Costing simulations 






















       
















       
















       
















       
Salary to get 100% of current cohort of nurses in rural area  1019  841  1046  1019 
Base salary for nurses (in Birr)  700  700  700  700 
Premium to make 100% of current cohort of nurses choose to work in a 
rural area (in Birr) 
319 141 346  319 
Premium as % of salary to make 100% of current cohort of nurses choose 
to work in a rural area (in % of base salary) 
31% 20% 33%  31% 
       
Salary to get 100% of current cohort of doctors in rural area  2,296  1,863  2,242  2,108 
Base salary for nurses (in Birr)  1,400  1,400  1,400  1,400 
Premium to get 100% of current cohort of doctors choose to work in a rural 
area (in Birr) 
896 463 842  708 
Premium as % of salary to make 100% of current cohort of doctors choose 
to work in a rural area (in % of base salary) 
39% 33% 38%  34% 
       
Required rise in annual health budget to make 100% of current cohort of 
nurses and doctors choose to work in a rural area (in Birr) 
7,337,454 5,589,942 7,659,348  6,904,302 
Required rise in annual health budget to make 100% of current cohort of 
nurses and doctors choose to work in a rural area (in USD) 
863,230 657,640 901,100  812,271 
Required rise in annual health budget to make 100% of current cohort of 
nurses and doctors choose to work in a rural areas (in % of current health 
budget) 
0.9% 0.7%  1% 0.9% 
       
Required rise in annual health budget to make 100% of current cohort of 
nurses and doctors choose to work in rural areas to reach doubling of 
number of nurses and doctors in 5 years (in % of current health budget)  
2.7 %  2.0 %  2.7 %  2.5 % 
Required rise in annual health budget to pay the basic salary when doubling 
the number of nurses an doctors in 5 years (in % of current health budget)  
5.2% 5.2% 5.2%  5.2% 
        
Appendix  
Sampling Procedure and Survey Methodology 
Sampling procedure 
 
We collected data from 219 nursing and 90 medical students sampled from eight clinical 
nursing schools and three medical faculties all over the country.  Clinical nurses represent 
about 67 % of the total number of nurses .
41  All medical faculties and their nursing 
school are selected.  The remaining sampled nursing schools, listed in Table 1, are 
selected from a complete list of twenty clinical nursing schools in four regions: Addis 
Ababa, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR.  We included at least one school per regions and 
per type of ownership. We distinguish four types of ownership: (i) public schools funded 
by the Federal Government; (ii) public schools funded by the Regional Health Bureau; 
(iii) private NGO schools and (iv) private for profit schools.   The nursing schools related 
to a medical faculty fall in the first category and are all (three) selected.  Since the other 
schools have a similar profile within each category, the selection in each category is on 
the basis of convenience.   
 

















Addis Ababa University  32  30  Public-Federal   Addis Ababa  136  67 
Gonder College  30  30  Public-Federal   Amhara  55  53 
Jimma University  20  30  Public-Federal   Oromiya  45  72 
Asella Nursing School  30    Public-Regional   Oromiya  101   
Yirgalem School of Nursing  30   Public-Regional    SNNPR 90   
Selihom Nursing School  27    NGO  SNNPR  30   
St. Lukes Catholic College  20    NGO  Oromiya  27   
Medco BioMedical College  30    Private  Addis Ababa  107   




The survey contains three instruments: a survey questionnaire, a medical knowledge test 
and two behavioural game.   
 
                                                 
41 We only survey nurses attending the two year diploma programme, and exclude the 1-year programme 
leading to a certificate in nursing because it is relatively recent and already being phased out on the basis 
that the technical specialization is insufficient (MOH, 2004).  The category of clinical nurse is also less 
well defined for certificate level nurses.    
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The designed in English and translated by a professional translator into Amharic; both 
versions were adapted after the pilot. All students were presented with the option to take 
the Amharic or the English version of the questionnaire.   
 
The test was prepared by a team of health professionals from Addis Ababa University 
under supervision of Gebreselassie Okubaghzi and Agnes Soucat to ensure that it takes 
both the curriculum and Ethiopian conditions into account.  On their advice, and after a 
pilot, the medical test was conducted in English.   
 
The English script for the game was translated into Amharic by a professional translator 
and then back translated to check for any alteration in meaning.  The game was explained 
in Amharic.  In each school only two sessions of the game were run, and to avoid 
contamination, they were implemented back-to-back so that students could not obtain 
information about the test or game on before hand.  In each school, three rooms were 
used so that people who played different roles in the games did not get to see each other 
(which might bias results). For more details see  
 
 Games  
Two games were played:  The Generalized Trust Game and the Tird Party Punishment 
Game.  
 
Generalized trust game 
The Generalized Trust Game involves two types of players, Proposers and Responders. 
Every player is allocated 40 Birr.
42 First, every Proposer is invited to send between zero 
and 40 Birr to the Responder. Whatever the Proposers send is tripled before being passed 
on to the Responders. Every Responder is then invited to send some part of that tripled 
amount to the Proposer.  In the version we played, the Proposer who originally sends the 
money is different from the Proposer who receives money from the Responder.
43  All 
students play the role of Responder. In that role they are asked to pass resources that have 
been entrusted to them, to a third party. This role has some of the characteristics of the 
health worker role that the students will fulfill when they start their careers. The extent to 
which the students respond positively to being entrusted with resources in the game may 
be a predictor of their response to being entrusted with public resources in real life. Thus, 
it might act as a proxy for their preference for or their behaviour in public service. Note 
that the students were asked to give a response for every scenario.  Before carrying out 
their task they had to write down how much they would pass on in each case:  if they 
would receive 15 Birr, 30 Birr, 45 Birr, etc.  This gives us several observations for each 
student and allows us to draw a response function for each of the students.   
 
Third Party Punishment Game 
                                                 
42 We only provide a brief description of the games here. Further details can be obtained from the authors. 
43 More precisely: Every Proposer is matched with two Responders, one to which they may send money 
during the game, and one from which they may receive money during the game. Similarly, every 
Responder is matched with two Proposers, one from which they may receive money during the game, and 
one to which they may send money during the game.     
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A second game we play is the Third Party Punishment Game.  This game involves three 
players, A, B, and C. Players A and B are allotted 50 Birr between them. Player A has to 
decide how this money is to be divided between himself and Player B. Player B receives 
whatever Player A allocates to them. Player C receives 25 Birr. Player C is informed of 
Player A’s decision and is then given the opportunity to pay zero, 5 Birr or 10 Birr to 
inflict punishment on Player A. For every 5 Birr that Player C pays, 15 Birr are taken 
away from Player A. Play is anonymous.  All students play the role of Player C. In this 
role, they are asked to pass judgment on what Player A has done and then to ‘put their 
money where there mouth is’. How much they are willing to pay to see Player A 
punished when they make low allocations to Player B is a direct measure of the strength 
of their negative reaction to an act of unfairness. As with the Generalized Trust Game we 
asked the students to write down the actions they would take before they received the 
information about A’s behaviour.  Again, this gives several observations for each student 
and enables us to draw a fining function for each student. 